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Is Public Procurement Going Green? 
Experiences and Open Issues 
Andrea Appolloni1, Alessio D’Amato2  and Cheng Wenjuan3 
 
Abstract:  
Public purchasing authorities are in a leading position for the introduction, promotion and development 
of green procurement. Indeed, the public sector can influence green procurement both by designing 
suitable policies and by driving “green” markets through the significant share of public purchases on 
GDP. The European Commission (EC) has emphasized the importance of cost-efficient GPP and, in 
compliance with the EU’s Integrated Product Policy (IPC), Member States have been encouraged to 
devise national action plans. As a result, many countries have already adopted steps in the direction of 
greening public purchases. The aim of our paper is twofold: first, we focus on the state of the art in 
terms of the EU and Italian Legislation; then, we highlight open questions related to crucial issues in 
GPP implementation, with a particular attention to the design of green tenders and awarding criteria to 
account for environmental quality in public purchasing procedures. 
Keywords: Green Public Procurement/Purchasing (GPP),  Italy,  EU, Legislation and Implementation.  
1. Introduction 
Since the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development of the United Nations 
in Rio de Janeiro, sustainable development has been considered as a common goal for 
human being by many countries throughout the world. Green Public Procurement 
(GPP) has been brought up for its remarkable potential contribution to such a goal. 
Green Public Procurement/Purchases encompasses all activities that aim to integrate 
environmental concerns into the purchasing process of public entities, which in turn 
impacts the product, transport and the whole production chain.  
GPP means that purchasing agencies take into account the environmental aspects 
when purchasing goods and services (Nissinen et al. (2009)). GPP, as a subset of 
sustainable procurement, is considered as one of the key policies to promote changes 
of unsustainable consumption and production patterns (Tukker et al., 2008; Clark, 
2007; European Commission, 2007). 
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Public purchasing is indeed a promising tool to boost the development of green 
procurement, as public authorities are at the same time responsible of environmental 
policy design and significant actors in green markets. Under the latter respect, public 
purchasing accounts for around 16% of the EU’s GDP, with much larger shares in 
specific sectors, such as, for instance, IT, energy-efficient buildings and public 
transportation. For a national example, in 2006 the Swedish authorities purchased 
goods and services totaling between 450 and 535 billion SEK, which corresponds to 
15-18 % of annual GDP (Bergman, 2008). GPP development has another striking 
example in Germany where practical GPP guidelines have existed for almost 20 years 
(Gunther and Scheibe, 2006).  
The European Commission (EC) is encouraging the deployment of cost-efficient GPP 
(COM 2008/400) and, in compliance with the EU’s Integrated Product Policy (IPC), 
Member States have been encouraged to devise national action plans. Accordingly, 
the role that authorities play in procurement has grown in importance, at both national 
and EU levels. Nowadays, many countries, have already adopted (at least 
preliminary) steps in the direction of greening public purchases (Li and Geiser, 2005). 
Crucial research questions arise: 
1. Is GPP indeed an effective environmental policy rule? 
2. How to shape GPP institutions in the broader public procurement setting? 
3. How to measure the degree of “greenness” of public procurement? 
Starting from these questions we aim to provide food for thought on the design of 
public procurement and, where possible, to identify the relevance of such questions in 
the application of GPP by Italian authorities. Our focus cannot be on a comprehensive 
and detailed analysis of what is green and what is not in Italy. However, we will move 
a preliminary step in this direction, by summing up some desirable GPP experiences 
in the EU and in our country and by highlighting some crucial open issues.   
2. The legislation status 
2.1 At the European Union (EU) level 
In 2001, EU published The Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy (IPP) and raised 
interest towards product-oriented environmental focus (European Commission, 2003). 
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The aim of IPP is to reduce the environmental impacts of products throughout their 
life cycle, taking into consideration also the market and competitiveness concerns 
(European Commission, 2003, p. 6). Increased demand for greener products by GPP, 
in competition with the more traditional products, is well suited to this market 
oriented approach of IPP. Environmentally responsible public procurement can also 
be seen as a driving force in the integration of environmental product policy 
instruments in the purchasing process (Li and Geiser, 2005). The preparation of new 
purchase directives in the EU between 2001 and 2004 fostered active debate 
regarding the possibility to use environmental grounds in public purchasing, and also 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development provided a 
recommendation on GPP in 2002 (OECD, 2002), according to which the OECD 
member countries agreed to improve the environmental performance of public 
procurement 
In 2004, Directives 2004/17 and 2004/18/EC, were approved by the European 
Parliament and the European Union Council of Ministers, with the aim of simplifying 
and modernizing procurement procedures, increasing competition and transparency, 
and explicitly including environmental criteria in the public purchases procedures.  
Also relevant to GPP is the publication of the Communication on Public Procurement 
for a Better Environment (EC Communication COM (2008) 4), which sets out to 
“...provide guidance on how to reduce the environmental impact caused by public 
sector consumption and to use GPP to stimulate innovation in environmental 
technologies, products and services”. Such Communication sets out, in particular,  an 
ambitious (though indicative) target according to which 50% of all public tendering 
procedures should have been compliant with core EU GPP criteria by 2010. 
After such Directives and Communications, the EU renewed the Sustainable 
Development Strategy in 2006, and in 2008 the Sustainable Consumption and 
Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan was published, aiming at 
improving the energy and environmental performance of products and at increasing 
the demand for more sustainable goods and production technologies. Along with the 
EU 2020 strategy, the Action Plan has set specific goals for the GPP in terms, for 
example, of energy saving end energy efficiency. More generally, the EU legislation 
on environmentally sustainable consumption and production has evolved rapidly in 
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the last few years, together with the related (explicit or implicit) obligations for the 
public sector. Relevant examples include: 
 energy end-use efficiency and energy services Directive (2006/32), 
 waste Directive (2008/98), explicitly underlying the role played by public 
purchasing authorities in waste reduction and management 
 Directive on the promotion of clean & energy efficient road transport vehicles 
(2009/33),  
 COM(2011)109, setting out an energy efficiency plan explicitly accounting 
for a key role to be played by public purchasing authorities and with a 
particular focus in public building restructuring and adoption of sustainability 
enhanced criteria. 
Besides the guidelines, which aim at instructing the practices of GPP, in 2006 
Public Procurement Remedies Directives (Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/ EEC) 
have been revised, in order to improve the effectiveness of national review procedures 
for the award of public contracts. Directive 2007/66/EC provides for rules aiming at 
obtaining a clear and effective procedure for bidders who consider contracts have 
been unfairly awarded to seek redress. The Directive gives to the rejected bidders the 
opportunity to start an effective and timely review procedure, when unfair decisions 
can still be corrected, and also seeks to combat illegal direct awards of public 
contracts, considered as the most serious infringement of EU procurement law.  
Clearly, a crucial issue in the process of greening public purchases is related to the 
assessment of what can be considered good or acceptable under a sustainable 
development perspective, as it is the assessment of the environmental impact of goods 
or services purchased (Larsen and Svane, 2005). As the EC (2007) suggests, a 
significant difference arises, for example, in terms of environmental consciousness in 
public purchases as well as if we focus on how environmental considerations integrate 
with social and ethical issues. The EC distinguishes between Sustainable Public 
Procurement, where public purchases take into account environmental as well as 
social and ethical aspects of sustainable procurement, while under Green Public 
Procurement contracting authorities “…take into account environmental elements 
when procuring goods, services or works at all stages of the project and within the 
entire life-cycle of procured goods“. 
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The appropriate definitions as well as the optimal degree of integration of 
environmental issues in the more general development strategies of countries and the 
EU are outside the scope of this paper. We only point out that the stricter the 
definition, the more difficult is the related implementation. Indeed, the EC (2007) 
recognizes that sustainable public procurement, though socially desirable, is indeed 
more difficult to measure and implement with respect to Green Public Procurement. 
As we recognize Sustainable public purchases as a long term objective, and as greener 
public purchases are yet in their early stages, we will focus our attention on GPP in 
the rest of our work.  
2.2 Domestic laws and regulations 
In Italy, the Public Procurement Code (approved by Legislative Decree April 
12, 2006, no. 163, which entered into force on July 1, 2006  - hereinafter referred to 
as the “Code”) governs public procurement. The Code has put together the previous 
Italian pieces of legislation on public procurement into one single text. As far as its 
scope is concerned, the Code covers public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts.  
Coherently with the EU legislation, a National Action Plan (NAP) on GPP has 
been adopted in 2008; such plan is being implemented by an inter-ministerial 
committee and is being supported by an advisory board, consisting of a body of 
representatives which includes scientists and stakeholders from all the involved 
sectors. The NAP establishes 3 main goals for GPP in Italy:  
 Efficiency using and saving of natural resources, especially energy; 
 Waste reduction; 
 Reduction in hazardous substances use.  
Also, it requires that at least 30% of goods purchased by public administration shall 
comply with ecological criteria and at least 30 to 40% shall have reduced electricity 
consumption. The NAP defines strict core criteria for GPP, leaving however space for 
adjustment through specific requirements concerning single issues (tenders design, 
minimum requirements etc.). Subsequent Decrees by the Italian government 
introduced explicit provisions concerning tender design issues. 
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Relevant examples under this respect include: 
 D.P.R. n. 205/2010: art. 6 amends the Code by introducing art. 180 bis 
concerning the role of public administrations in promoting initiatives to boost 
reuse and recycling of waste.  
 D.P.R. n. 207/2010: art. 120 introduces the obligation for public purchasers to 
include environmental criteria in evaluating the most economically 
advantageous offer (see below) 
Other decrees were also approved between 2009 and 2011, to ratify existing EU 
Directives as well as to regulate specific issues (for example in October 2010 and in 
February 2011 minimum requirements concerning specific goods and services were 
introduced). 
 
 3. Is GPP an effective environmental policy tool? 
A first broad question which is somewhat in the background of our paper is 
related to the effectiveness of GPP in obtaining environmental policy objectives 
(energy savings, waste and pollution reduction etc.) As Brannlund et al. (2009) 
underline, though generally regarded as an effective means to secure environmental 
improvements, GPP has been little studied within a framework of welfare economics. 
From this perspective the authors assess GPP as an environmental policy tool and 
compare it to other tools, such as taxes. Effectiveness and efficiency of environmental 
policy instruments is the subject of a substantial amount of literature (See, among 
others, Tietenberg (2009). Brannlund et al. (2009) show that the standard cost 
effectiveness argument (equalization of marginal costs of environmental care) is 
likely to be violated by GPP procedures, while other instruments (pollution permits, 
environmental taxation) are, at least theoretically, capable of achieving an efficient 
(i.e. least cost) outcome, for a given environmental target. An example in this respect 
can be based on the uniformity of environmental requirements across potential tender 
participants. As a result of such uniformity heterogeneities across participants is not 
exploited and marginal costs are not equalized. Such inefficiency is however 
somewhat reduced if we focus on awarding criteria: giving the same weight to 
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environmental performance implies that firms featuring smaller marginal costs of 
environmental protection will be able to offer, ceteris paribus, a better deal, 
improving the efficiency of the tendering process. 
Turning to the impact of GPP on market competition, Brannlund et al. (2009) have 
underlined that it is a purely empirical question. The net outcome is in fact difficult to 
establish theoretically, and it is likely to be market specific. Also, the impact on price 
can be counterintuitive, i.e. a larger competition might be coupled with higher prices, 
due, for example, to adjustment costs by bidding firms. Reverting again to the 
environmental requirements example, stricter environmental conditions will imply 
more or less competition depending on the number and size of firms that gets out of 
the tendering process (as they do not meet the required standards) or choose to 
participate (as they are capable of complying with the standards). 
Finally, in the reduction of the environmental impact of public purchases the authors 
show that GPP can be linked in a very weak way to environmental improvements, as 
procurement procedures are likely to account for such improvements in an “indirect 
way”.  
These considerations suggest that further theoretical and empirical research is needed 
to investigate the proper role of public procurement in coping with environmental 
issues. As Walker and Phillips (2006) underline, the majority of sustainable supply 
research has been conducted in the private sector, though (mainly empirical) literature 
on the greening of public purchase is growing4.  
A general conclusion would suggest that GPP is more likely to be an efficient policy 
choice in sectors where standard environmental policy instruments are difficult to be 
implemented and/or are in their very early stages. Also, we can expect it to be fruitful 
when it is introduced in sectors characterized by relatively new technologies 
(recycling, renewable energy), where the exploitation of economies of scale and scope 
is necessary to make firms operating in such sectors able to be competitive.  On the 
other hand, we deem as very unlikely the chance for GPP to be an effective policy 
tool in sectors where public intervention is already well established. Being however 
the judgment of GPP as an effective and efficient policy tool necessarily based on a 
case by case analysis, we can conclude that a first open issue arising from our paper is 
																																																								
4 For detailed surveys, see the already cited Walker and Phillips (2006) and Brannlund et al. (2009). 
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related to the need of assessing welfare effects of existing and future GPP practices in 
Italy.  
 
4. Green Practices in the EU and in Italy 
4.1. Good environmental GPP practices in the EU 
Several examples of GPP implementation in the EU suggest that a significant effort is 
being devoted to progress along the GPP pathway.  
The EU Commission has published a guidebook in several languages (European 
Commission, 2004), and national guidebooks have also been published (e.g. in 
Finland in 2004).  
Also, the EC with Communication 400 in 2008 focuses on the removal of obstacles to 
a full implementation of GPP procedures in the EU. Several hurdles are identified 
under this respect, including:  
 limited established environmental criteria for products / services as well as the 
absence of publicity mechanisms 
 Insufficient information on life cycle costing of products and the relative costs of 
environmentally friendly products / services. 
 Low awareness of the benefits of environmentally friendly products and services. 
 Uncertainty about legal possibilities to include environmental criteria in tender 
documents. 
 Lack of political support and resources. 
 
The Communication then sets out objectives, funding as well as core sectors. In 
targets setting, a major role is acknowledged to several Member States who took the 
lead in promoting GPP practices. For example, the Dutch government has set a 100% 
Sustainable Procurement target to be reached by 2010; the Austrian Government has 
identified ambitious targets to be met by 2010 for relevant sectors, such as IT, 
electricity and paper. France, has set equivalent, though apparently less ambitious, 
targets in terms of “clean” vehicles. Finally, the Sustainable Procurement Action Plan 
in UK aims to reduce Government’s carbon emissions by 30% within 2020.  
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Significant guidance is provided by the EU. We do not go into details5. However, it 
could be useful to provide additional details on the actual implementation status in the 
EU as well as exemplify how green criteria are currently integrated  into the public 
procurement procedures (see table 1).   
Table 1 - Priority sectors and green Criteria in selected sectors 
 Product 
Group Product Core Criteria 
Comprehensive  
Criteria 
1 
 
Cleaning 
products & 
Services 
 
Cleaning Services 
(Including cleaning 
products) 
 
 Use of cleaning products 
without hazardous substances 
 Training of 
employees 
 Use of reusable 
microfiber 
clothing and/or 
dry –cleaning 
techniques 
2 
 
 
Construction 
 
 
New Buildings and 
offices 
 Consideration of energy –
saving measures in design 
and usage phase of building 
 Water- saving technologies 
in kitchen and sanitary 
facilities 
 Use of material without 
hazardous substances 
 Use of timber from legal 
sources 
 
 Use of 
localization 
renewable 
energy sources 
3  Electricity 
 
Electricity 
 
 50% or higher electricity 
from renewable  energy 
sources 
 100% 
electricity from 
renewable 
energy sources 
4 
 
Catering 
&Food 
 
Catering Services 
(Including Food) 
 Organic production of food 
products 
 Use of seasonal fruit, 
vegetable and fish 
 
5  Gardening 
 
Gardening Services 
and machinery 
 Fuel type use of gardening 
machines 
 Use of soil improvement 
without peat and sewage 
sludge 
 
6 
 
Office IT 
equipment 
 
Computers 
(desktops &laptop) 
and monitors 
 Energy star standards 
 Accessibility and 
changeability of memory 
hard disks and/or CD/DVD 
drives 
 
 
7  Paper 
 
Copying and 
graphic paper 
 Production from recovered 
paper fibers 
 Use of ECF/TCF paper 
 Pulp production from 
sustainable managed forests 
for paper based on virgin 
fibres 
 
8 Textiles Clothing  Oko –Tex Standard 100  
 
																																																								
5 To have an idea of how extensive EU guidance on GPP is, please refer to: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm  
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9  Transport 
 
Passengers cars 
and light duty 
vehicles 
 Maximum CO2 emission per 
vehicle segment 
 Euro 5 standard 
 
10 Furniture Office Furniture 
 Use of wood from legally 
sources timber and 
sustainably managed forests 
 
Source - Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009)  
 
Table 1 sums up core and comprehensive criteria related to a selected set of 
sectors and green environmental targets. Core targets address the most significant 
environmental impacts, and are relatively easily verifiable, while comprehensive 
targets are related to the achievement of more ambitious objectives which require 
more effort and more difficult verification. Such targets are coherent with the GPP 
training toolkit developed by the EU. 
 
Figure 1 - Relevance of GPP on total public procurement in terms of value              
 
 Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009) 
Figure 2. Relevance of GPP on total public procurement in terms of the number of contracts  
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Green	‐ 7	average
Netherlands
Germany
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Austria
United	Kingdom
Core	Green Comprehensive	Green Non	Green
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Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009) 
 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009) provide details on the status 
of actual implementation of GPP practices in the so called Green-7 countries (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and UK). Figures 1 and 2 
represent, respectively, the relative relevance of core and comprehensive criteria in 
terms of value and the number of contracts respectively. 
As it clearly emerges, the Green-7 countries feature on average 45% of the total value 
and 55% of the total number of contracts in 2006/07.   
The same report underlines how GPP procedures in the Green-7 have generated 
significant environmental gains, at least in terms of Co2 emissions, that on average 
has been reduced by 25% with a maximum of -47% in the Netherlands (figure 3).  
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Figure 3 - CO2 impact of GPP per country 
                   
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009) 
Also, we can conclude that the evaluated GPP procedures have been win-win, 
improvements in several cases, i.e. they also generated significant financial gains in 
terms of cost reduction. 
Figure 4- Financial impact of GPP per country 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009) 
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Finally, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009) focuses on the 
combination of Co2 and financial impact, and conclude that transport, construction 
and electricity are sectors that deserve attention by the public procurement authorities, 
as they appear to be the most cost effective in terms of the reduction of environmental 
impact per Euro spent. Additional, more detailed assessments of the status of GPP 
implementation in the EU are out of the scope of this paper, and can be found, among 
others, in AEA (2010), while a detailed analysis of the related costs and benefits can 
also be found in Öko-Institut e. V. and ICLEI (2007)  with reference to years 
2006//20076. Also, additional evidence, mainly referred to Nordic countries, will be 
presented in section 5.3. 
 
 
4.2 GPP implementation in Italy  
As the last section has clarified, GPP brings about significant environmental 
benefits that might well be coupled with financial gains to contracting authorities. 
Turning to Italy, legislation has progressed towards a larger implementation of GPP, 
and several aspects of public purchases are now subject to environment related 
regulation and incentives. The current status of GPP in Italy appears, however, 
scattered, with several virtuous cases but compliance and management efforts that 
appear still weak and lacking a kind of national coordination. As a result, it is difficult 
to provide a comprehensive idea of the development of GPP in Italy. However, 
several examples can be provided, to give a flavor of how matters are developing. 
Consip S.p.a. is a first significant example; Consip is a public stock company 
owned by the Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) that operates on 
behalf of the State, within the framework of the strategic guidelines and tasks given 
by MEF itself7.  
Consip has no profit goals and deals with two main fields of action: 
1. Consultancy on technical and organizational projects 
2. Set up, diffusion and support on eProcurement system and tools 
																																																								
6 Also, to have specific examples of GPP in EU countries please refer to: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/case_en.htm 
7 See http://www.eng.consip.it/on-line/en/Home.html. 
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Under an environment/sustainability point of view, several specific initiatives have 
been undertaken over time by Consip, including IT and energy efficiency related 
projects. Table 3 shows an application of environmental criteria to IT procurement 
according to Consip strategies. As it clearly emerges, sustainability criteria are 
accounted for in the whole life cycle of IT machineries, from the design to the 
production phase, down to the end of life and the management of the related waste. 
The estimated environmental impact and costs savings are significant. For example, 
improved energy efficiency is expected to bring about around € 1,575 Million in 
terms of costs savings8. 
 
Table 2 - Consip approach to GPP in IT public procurement 
Design 
 
 Increase of Energy Efficiency 
 Cost Reduction 
 Environmental Impact Reduction 
 
 
Production
 
 Reduction/Elimination of use of 
hazardous substances 
 Decrease if Environmental impacts 
 Optimization of carriage packaging 
 
 
 Correct energy use management 
 Information management on 
environmental impacts 
 Use of alternative sources of energy 
 
Use 
 
 
 Reuse 
 Recycling 
 Disassembly of Equipment 
 Recycling of consuming materials 
 
End of Life 
Source: Capparelli (2011). 
 
Another example might be found in the framework contract on “Integrated Energy 
Management Services” (heating services including improvement of energy efficiency, 
consumption reduction and CO2 emissions avoidance) launched by Consip9 in 2006. 
The tendering process was an open procedure with 12 lots awarded to five different 
suppliers; the framework was awarded on the basis of the most economically 
advantageous tender (MEAT), with 70% of marks allocated to price and 30% to 
quality. Significant effects have been obtained both in terms of cost savings (27%, 
																																																								
8 For details see Capparelli (2011). 
9 For this example, please refer to: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/pdf/news_alert/Issue11_Case_Study27_Consip_Energy.pdf  
For details on framework contracts see Albano and Sparro (2010) 
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involving approximately 5,000 buildings) and in terms of energy savings (around 
6000 tonnes of oil equivalent).  
Several other GPP initiatives have been implemented in Italy. Among others: 
 the ARPAT (Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione Ambientale della Toscana, the 
Environmental Protection Agency in Tuscany), where a pilot GPP project for 
cleaning services for two of its 19 offices was introduced in 2004. Due to the 
results, in March 2009, the procedure was replicated on a broader scale to 
encompass all of its offices. The procurement was an open procedure for a three-
year contract worth € 2.2 Million – 11 bids were submitted.  
 the Municipality of Rome, in 2001, begun a program called “Sustainable Food 
Procurement for School in Rome” in 2001 which aimed to support organic 
agriculture and organic food chains, and its most recent call for tender for the 
school food service covers the period September 2007 – June 2012 and has a base 
value of approximately € 355 Million. This program has improved the market in 
terms of sustainability by procuring organic agriculture products and in turn has 
reduced the environmental impact of food production and the related activities10.  
 All the above pieces of evidence, though not exhaustive, has the merit to show 
that GPP is increasingly adopted in Italy11. On the other hand, several issues have yet 
to be addressed. 
 
5. GPP: open issues 
5.1. The degree of centralization 
5.1.1. GPP and functional centralization 
Accord to Martimort (1996), the allocation of jurisdictions across 
governmental agencies can be analyzed by mean of models dealing with multiple 
principals in the presence of asymmetric information.  
Indeed, government authorities cannot be viewed as a unique body pursuing a 
common objective but, rather, as a set of entities with different and somewhat 
																																																								
10 These two examples are, again, taken from http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/case_en.htm 
11 For other detailed case studies see, for example, FocusLab (2005).  
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diverging objectives. Also, the design of regulatory tools must be implemented in the 
real world, where there are significant informational asymmetries between regulated 
firms and government bodies. 
Under this respect, the example of GPP is straightforward: price reduction and 
environmental quality of tenders outcomes are competing objectives that might be 
potentially pursued by competing authorities. It is therefore meaningful to investigate 
the costs and benefits related to separation of duties among several regulators and/or 
the integration of functions in a single authority.  
Baron (1985) models a regulatory setting close to the US framework, where a 
Public Utility Commission is interested in welfare of single States’ consumers and 
taxpayers but is also interested in the profit of the regulated firm(s) located in the 
same State, while a Federal Environmental Protection Agency is interested in welfare 
effects related to the environmental impact of regulated firms’ activity at the whole 
country (i.e. Federal) level. In Baron’s setting an institutional ordering of jurisdictions 
is assumed, so that the Environmental Protection Agency is capable of free riding on 
the regulatory design (and costs) imposed at a State level by the Public Utility 
Commission; as a result, environmental protection is stronger when the two 
authorities act in an independent way.  Opposite results are obtained by Martimort 
(1996), where no ordering of jurisdictions is introduced: in a hidden information (i.e. 
adverse selection) context, both regulators design their intervention in order to free 
ride as much as possible on the capability of the other regulator’s contribution to 
guarantee that a socially desirable project is indeed undertaken, leading to sub-
optimal equilibria featuring a lower likelihood that the beneficial project is performed.  
D’Amato (2006) extends Martimort in a GPP setting (including also the 
possibility of moral hazard), where the environmental quality of public purchases 
changes under two possible institutional settings: a centralized one, where a single 
regulator is in charge of both production efficiency and environmental quality, and a 
decentralized one, where two separate bodies operate, namely an environmental 
agency securing environmental quality and a procurement agency pursuing efficiency. 
The main conclusions are that decentralization results in a  downward distortion in 
environmental quality as compared to the case of a single integrated authority.  
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A conclusion stemming from the above papers is, again, that a more applied 
research is needed. Indeed, the institutional scenario might change across countries 
and sectors, so that countries like US feature a federal-level EPA and State level 
public utilities regulation while in other countries such as Italy no such ordering 
exists. Further, some of the standard for environmental quality in GPP might be set at 
a EU level while other environmental as well as non-environmental requirements 
might be set by Italian and other member states government bodies. The assessment 
of the optimal regulatory setting can therefore be expected to be country and sector 
specific, and the theoretical analysis presented can be deemed only as a starting point 
towards a full understanding of the needed steps to achieve the best possible 
integration of powers in GPP management and design. 
 
5.1.2. GPP and “demand” centralization  
 Demand centralization/decentralization is another hot issue in the shaping of 
the Italian Procurement procedures that might have a significant impact in terms of 
environmental quality. Currently, there is no constraint for public purchasers to act in 
a cooperative way. As a result, several local bodies might be in charge of public 
procurement to satisfy local needs.  
 According to Albano and Sparro (2010), the main economic justification for 
public purchases centralization can be found in the need to reduce the related costs. It 
is a fact that several countries feature national (i.e. centralized) procurement agencies 
(US, UK being two important examples). Cost savings are mainly related to the 
ability of reducing the buying price as well as to the reduction in transaction costs.  
Under the first respect, a major role is played by the possibility to exploit the 
significant economies of scale that tenders participants are likely to experience due to 
a larger production level, as well as the increased bargaining power the contracting 
authority would get by holding a sort of monopsony power.  
On the other hand, the reduction in costs might also be related to the achievement of 
transaction costs reductions related to “optimal” procurement process via 
specialization, investments in infrastructures (for example e-procurement tools) etc.  
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 The impact of public procurement centralization can be significant also in 
terms of innovation. Indeed, public procurement might “correct” the market outcome 
by internalizing positive externalities stemming from innovation, in a kind of “market 
pull” approach. Such an approach would have the merit of providing firms developing 
new products and processes with less uncertainty in their potential market, therefore 
reducing the risk related to R&D related investments. Under this respect, 
environmental innovations and the reduction in the related risk are an important 
example. Also, in the presence of network effects, green purchases might boost a 
“new” and/or environmental market by sustaining a learning by doing process on the 
demand side. More generally, as already suggested, centralizing public purchases 
might make it more likely that minimum production scales are reached in innovative 
sectors. 
 Another impact of public procurement centralization in innovative sectors is 
related to the expenses in financing R&D as well as educational programs, which 
needs substantial budgets to be properly implemented.  
 Other significant reasons that might affect the way in which GPP translates 
into a better environmental quality are linked to the degree of positive or negative 
externalities stemming from public purchases. A first consideration under this respect 
suggests that a local authority might be willing to internalize pollution damages only 
to a very limited extent when the pollution problem at hand is of a regional or global 
nature (such as CO2), i.e. it mainly generates damages far from the source. This raises  
significant free riding incentives, leading to too little weight potentially given to 
environmental quality in the awarding criteria and too weak environmental 
requirements to access the tendering process.  
Another important issue has to do with the time horizon of procurement 
authorities and to the weight assigned to future benefits and costs (as measured by the 
discount rate). Consider the example of the functional obsolescence of the objects of a 
tendering process. A small purchasing authority is very likely not to have the 
specialized and highly qualified know how that would be needed to account for the 
proper discount rate to perform a rigorous analysis of the costs and benefits related to 
obsolescence. Also, we can expect a smaller authority to have a smaller time horizon 
with respect to a larger authority. This is likely to lead smaller authorities to choose a 
suboptimal obsolescence and to provide an inefficiently small weight on the duration 
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of the procured good, leading to a larger than efficient impact on the environment. A 
straightforward example is related to IT purchases. A too large discount rate (a larger 
impatience) and a smaller time horizon would lead to buy cheaper computers 
featuring a quicker obsolescence, implying larger impacts on virgin material as well 
as a larger waste production.  
Of course, procurement centralization also features significant difficulties, 
including the possibility of larger tenders to exclude smaller firms and, above all, the 
risk of lock-in related to the repeated nature of the procurement process. Also, a 
centralized procurement design might imply a lower capability of public purchases 
authorities to account for local specificities in demand. Costs and benefits must 
therefore be carefully evaluated. However, the environmental benefits of 
centralization might be worth the effort in designing procurement procedures in such 
a way to avoid lock in or “excess scale” problems, for example through the adoption 
of multiple lots tenders and limits to the number of contracts that can be awarded by 
each winner12.  
 
5.2. How to put the environment in public procurement strategies? 
According to Piga and Zanza (2004), the design of public procurement involves 
several steps, including the number of lots, the length of the contract as well as 
participation requirements and awarding criteria. 
We will focus in this section on two crucial parts of the tendering process design in 
the shaping of GPP procedures, namely requirements and award criteria.  
5.2.1. Selection of participants 
As Palmujoki et al. (2010) point out, a first possibility for public contracting 
authorities to include environmental quality in tendering processes is by setting it as a 
																																																								
12 More details on the available solutions can be found, among others,  Lewis and Yildirim (2006) and 
in Anton and Yao (1989). 
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prequalification of bidders, as mandatory requirements for the contract, or as 
contractual terms. Some examples under this respect include13:  
 the exclusion companies that have acted against environmental legislation or 
regulations  
 the inclusion of green considerations in the technical capacity criteria in terms 
of the past experience of companies and of the professional qualifications of 
its personnel 
 the inclusion of environmental management systems, such as EMAS, or other 
Eco-labels, such as the EU Ecolabel, as a means of proof for that technical 
capacity. 
More generally, the selection of participants is an important albeit complex phase of 
GPP design. Indeed, several difficulties can be identified. First of all, according to EU 
legislation, mandatory requirements cannot be discriminatory, so that if, for example, 
the technical specifications imply that the EU Ecolabel is enough to guarantee 
technical capability, potential participants must be admitted also on the basis of other, 
equivalent, proofs of the same capability.  
The following table represents a good example of “green tenders” design using the 
EU Ecolabel. As it clearly emerges from the table, the use of an Ecolabel must 
guarantee that no discrimination takes place among bidders based exclusively on the 
Ecolabel itself. 
  
																																																								
13 See EC (2010). 
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Table 3- Using the European Ecolabel in GPP 
 
Using the European Ecolabel in GPP 
 
  
Right 
 
Wrong 
Specification 
All offered cleaning must meet 
the ecological criteria of the 
European Ecolabel 
All offered cleaning products 
must carry the European 
Ecolabel 
Verification 
Products carrying the European 
Ecolabel will be deemed to 
comply. Any other appropriate 
means of proof will also be 
accepted, such as the technical 
dossier of the manufacturer or a 
test report from a recognised 
body 
 
 
The products must carry a 
European Ecolabel 
 
Award Criteria 
Additional points will be 
awarded to products that meet 
the ecological criteria of the 
European Ecolabel 
Additional points will be 
awarded to the products that 
carry the European Ecolabel 
Source: EC(2008) 
 
Also, important tradeoffs are involved at this stage, the most important being tight 
requirements vs. competition; for example, stricter technical specifications might 
imply that potential bidders are excluded from the tender, reducing the number of 
potential participants and, therefore, the degree of competition. This is why, in some 
cases, the tendering process can introduce mild environmental prerequisites and 
choose, instead, to use stricter environmental standards in the awarding criteria. As 
we have seen in section 4, this has been the case in the design of recent IT tenders 
held by the Italian public purchasing agency CONSIP 
5.2.2. Awarding criteria 
 Turning to awarding criteria themselves, they are indeed viewed as a crucial 
step in the design of any public procurement tender, and they can be very fruitfully 
used to address environmental issues.  The existing public procurement Directives 
clarify that contracts awarding might be based on two main options, i.e.:  
 the lowest price  
 the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) 
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The first one only awards the contract to the bidder that succeeds in making the least 
costly offer, while in the second case a “scoring rule” can be implemented, including 
criteria other than the price in the score according to which the contract is awarded.  
Clearly, if the environment is an issue, using the lowest price as the only 
awarding procedure requires the other phases of the tender to be properly designed 
(for example in terms of technical specifications), while the MEAT implies that 
bidding can be left open to competition while the environment can be judged in the 
awarding procedure. On the other hand, the MEAT appears to leave discretionary 
power in setting the scoring rule, with the risk of not accounting for the environment 
properly. As a result, there is no one size fits all solution under this respect.  
If the environment is included in the awarding criteria according to the MEAT, 
then the contracting authorities have to set out both the environmental characteristics 
and their scores in the call for tenders. Such scores must be publicly available and 
transparent; also, they have to be objectively quantifiable. Though such goals make it 
clear how difficult setting awarding criteria can be, commonly used procedures exist. 
Indeed, as the EC (2010) suggests, a widely used methodology is Life Cycle Costing 
(LCC) , properly including: 
 purchase and all associated costs (delivery, installation, commissioning, etc.), 
 operating costs, including energy, spares, and maintenance, 
 end-of-life costs, such as decommissioning and removal. 
The adoption of LCC and, more generally, a Life Cycle approach to GPP can lead to 
significant costs savings in the public procurement procedures, a higher energy 
efficiency of buildings and IT equipments being two possible examples. 
An evaluation of the relevance of awarding criteria in environmentally related 
public procurement procedures can be found in Kippo-Edlund et al. (2005). Using 
data collected in spring 2003, the authors conclude that 58% of the Swedish tender 
calls included some kind of environmental criteria, but only 36% included 
environmental award criteria. Environmental aspects were considered also in 
selection criteria (36% of tender calls), technical specifications (39%), and contract 
clauses (12%). Another contribution, more focused on the role played by 
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environmental considerations in MEAT, is the one by Parikka-Alhola et al. (2006); 
using data collected in the period 21 july – 29 september, 2005 in three Nordic 
Countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden), the authors found that the total price of 
the purchase accounts (on average) for 50% of the awarding scores whereas quality 
accounts for 37% of the scores. In addition, delivery and contractual terms are worth 
7% of scores and environment is weighted on average 3.3% of the scores. This 
suggests the interesting result that a bidder that accounts properly for environmental 
criteria can on average charge a price that is 3.3% larger than a bidder that does not 
achieve good environmental scores. This is a relevant information, as it suggests that 
some (though limited) gain from making a greener bid can be obtained by firms.  
Other examples confirming the tendency of GPP to focus on awarding criteria as one 
of the tools to provide incentives to environment friendly bids can be found in 
examples already reported in section 4.2. Having said of the relative weight of energy 
efficiency in the Consip framework contract on “Integrated Energy Management 
Services”,  it is also interesting to note that in the GPP example related to sustainable 
food procurement for schools in Rome, the awarding criteria specify that slightly less 
than half of the score (49 points) was supposed to be assigned according to quality, 
including environmental criteria. An even clearer example can be found in the 
copying paper procurement framework contract designed in the Lombardy region in 
Italy. Award criteria include in this case the possibility to assign 20 technical points to 
competitors offering14: 
 Paper with FSC, PEFC, Blaue Engel, EU Ecolabel, Nordic Swan or equivalent 
certification; 
 Advance notice of delivery by e-mail; 
 Use of a delivery service with green vehicles assessed through random checks 
on registration documents; 
 Use of a delivery service with green pallets (FSC or equivalent certification) 
Finally, as clarified in Table 3, it is crucial to underline the need for awarding criteria 
to be designed in such a way to be non discriminatory. The related considerations 
made in discussing participants selection also apply here. 
 
																																																								
14 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/case_en.htm, Example 15. 
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5.3. Measuring the “greenness” of public procurement: methodologies and 
further research 
The last issue we are willing to address is related to the need to measure whether 
public procurement is indeed green or sustainable. This is a challenging task for 
several reasons, mainly related to the difficulties in providing an objective (e.g. 
monetary) measure for certain kinds of environmental damages, as well as to the 
complexities related to the need of disentangling green characteristics from “non 
green” ones.  For example, while it is relatively easy to spread the good news about 
improved energy efficiency and in terms of reduced (estimated) CO2 emissions, it is 
not as easy to disseminate evidence concerning reduction in life expectancy and the 
related social losses.  
A somewhat different hurdle lies in the very limited amount of available literature 
on the topic. More precisely, while several papers address the qualitative impacts and 
the design of public procurement procedures, very little effort has been devoted to the 
measurement of the degree of “greenness” of public (as well as private) purchases 
(Walker and Phillips, 2006).  Significant exceptions, however, exist.  
The received literature has measured the state of GPP through the use of 
environmental criteria in tender calls and documents (Bouwer et al., 2005; Kippo-
Edlund et al., 2005); most of these contributions are, however, focused on Nordic 
countries. In a more recent contribution (Palmujoki et al., 2010), the authors focus 
specifically on the existence and applicability of environmental criteria in the 
procurement contracts and discuss the comprehensiveness and enforceability of the 
drafted terms and conditions in the same contracts, highlighting the practices that 
appear as the most functional and practical from the procuring authorities’ point of 
view. As the authors show, with reference to Sweden and Finland,  the application of 
GPP is increasing over time. However, the inclusion of environmental clauses in 
procurement contracts is still not widely used. Also, the clauses vary widely in terms 
of both accuracy and enforceability by the procurement authorities. 
The above literature is mainly based on tender calls analysis. As Bouwer et al. 
(2005) underline, such analysis is mainly performed by gathering tender related 
documents along a chosen time span from a variety of public bodies (Local 
Authorities, Central Government, Hospitals, etc.), and by classifying them according 
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to product groups and according to the role played by environmental criteria in the 
tender documents, technical specification, awarding score and criteria etc. 
Though objective, such a methodology suffers from several limitations, including:  
1. Information contained in the tender document has to be complemented by the 
actual awarding results (winner, value of purchases etc.). 
2. The publication of tenders is compulsory only above a certain tender value (so 
called “above the EU threshold” tenders). On the other hand, very limited information 
is available concerning smaller tenders. 
3. Information on the purchasing body can be crucial in explaining green 
behaviour and in directing the related policy interventions. On the other hand, such 
information is in general not included in the tender and difficult to obtain.  
4. The willingness to pay for greener public purchases might not be the only 
determinant of demand for sustainable goods/services by public bodies. Indeed, EU 
regulation and targets might affect the observed GPP related demand. 
These difficulties suggest the need to complement tender documents analysis with 
interviews that completes the available information, including details both on the 
public bodies involved with the specific tender and on the final outcome of the tender 
itself.  An online procedure based on questionnaires has been used, among others, by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Significant and Ecofys (2009), in the report on GPP that 
was presented in section 4.1. concerning the EU.  
Of course, also the use of questionnaires has limitations, as they can lead to a bias 
in respondent’s reaction (they can state they are willing to pay for green purchases 
just to show they act in a socially responsible way, or they can give a distorted view 
of the purchasing organization they work for). Also, it is more likely that a selection 
bias takes place, as respondents are likely to come from organizations that are already 
involved, or more willing to be involved, in GPP. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Green Public Procurement can be (and has proven to be) a potentially very  
effective tool in the context of environmental policy, leading in some cases to win-
win situations where the reduction in environmental impacts of public purchases is 
coupled with a reduction in the related costs. This is, however, not a general 
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conclusion, so that the opportunity of introducing GPP targets and incentives must be 
carefully evaluated with sector and country specific analyses. Also, the performance 
of GPP depends in a crucial way on how it is designed and, specifically, on the degree 
of centralization and on the way environmental criteria are accounted for along the 
“GPP chain”. Under the latter respect, the inclusion of environmental considerations 
in awarding criteria can play a significant role and is, therefore, a sensitive issue for 
future research. 
The main conclusion that stems from our work suggests the need to improve 
data availability to make GPP design and implementation more efficient. This is 
straightforward if we look at the Italian case: the building up of comprehensive data 
sets might be crucial in determining whether the current system is properly designed 
or if changes in design are needed, for example in terms of a larger degree of 
centralization. Also, measuring the degree to which GPP is indeed green and/or 
sustainable needs a substantial systematization of available information on tender 
calls, value and features of procurement contracts. This is a key issue to measure the 
state of the art of GPP implementation in Italy, and to suggest directions for future 
policies in the field. 
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